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I ntr oducti on
Examination of the transformation of urban Chinatends to rely on dichotomies such as tradition vs.modernity, past vs. future, collectivism vs. individual-
ism, public (gong) vs. private (si), and rural vs. urban. This
paper tries to sidestep these distinctions by looking at the re-
vival of private property and its limits in urban China. 
In the governmental scheme of traditional China no clear
distinction was drawn between cities and the countryside. (1)
Urbanisation and the formation of “modern” cities in Re-
publican China undermined such uniformity and gave birth
to the urban-rural divide. The gap between the urban and
the rural has become even wider in the post-1949 era. Mao’s
revolutionary rhetoric was pro-village and anti-city, because
the rural area in Southern China (e.g., Jiangxi and Fujian)
was his revolutionary base. But in the post-1949 era, indus-
trialisation was set, in emulation of the USSR, as the prior-
ity in state policy and state-building. The development of the
city thereafter proceeded at the expense of the countryside,
and the household registration system (huji zhidu) (2) made,
at least in theory, the gap between the rural and the urban
even wider. 
Yet in post-Deng China, as cities expand into their rural pe-
ripheries, legal distinctions between urban and rural become
blurred, and in due course the boundaries of cities and the
legal regimes applicable in them will need to be redefined. (3)
For example, in the rural area, a de facto real estate market
is emerging with affordable prices under the label of “minor
property rights” (xiaochanquan) or “township property
rights” (xiangchanquan). This invites an analysis of how the
boundaries between the urban and the rural and between
public property and private property are being drawn in
modern China. T he  e m er genc e of  ur b an p r ope r ty ma r ke ts  in  China
The advent of socialist rule in 1949 brought significant
changes to the official conception of property. Between
1956 and 1978, “the private” was deemed to be evil and vir-
tually abolished. (4) Since the beginning of market reform, the
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1. On rural-urban uniformity in traditional China see e.g., F. W. Mote, “The Transformation
of Nanjing, 1350-1400,” in G. William Skinner (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China,
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1977, pp. 101-154. 
2. The rigid household system was established in 1958. Mobility was prohibited, especially
the mobility from the rural to the urban areas. 
3. It is clear to most observers that much of China’s rural economy relies, partly or largely,
depending on the region, on remittances from family members who work legally or ille-
gally in urban centres.
4. Private ownership was not formally abolished in 1949, and a mixed economy was
adopted between 1949 and 1956 as a prelude to nationalisation of private capital.
Whether nor not a complete system of public ownership was established is unclear. For
example, Article 11 of the 1954 Constitution recognised private property: “the State pro-
tects the right of citizens to own lawfully-earned incomes, savings, houses and other
means of life.” Article 12 of the 1954 Constitution provides: “the State protects the right
of citizens to inherit private property according to law.” The content of Article 11 of the
1954 Constitution was restated in Article 9 of the 1975 Constitution, but “the right to in-
herit private property” was abandoned in the 1975 Constitution. 
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This paper focuses on the revival of private property and its limits in urban China. It explores the emergence of
urban property markets; urban property-holding in relation to the complexity of urban governance; “minor property
rights apartments” that form a de facto real estate market and cross over the urban-rural divide; the “grey areas” of
blurring legal and administrative boundaries in modern China; and recent changes to the rural land system and the
rural-urban divide. The conclusion flags the theme of the city as laboratory with regard to the blurring legal and
governmental urban-rural distinction.
The City as Laboratory and the Urban-Rural Divide
private sector has re-emerged and the status of private prop-
erty has gradually been rehabilitated. Legislation acknowl-
edged this rehabilitation. In the post-1978 era, the long
process of drafting a new property law (wuquanfa) for China
took place against the backdrop of the development of the
private sector and legislating to promote a “market econ-
omy.” (5) The 1988 Constitution was amended to allow the
transfer of land use rights. (6) The Provisional Regulation on
the Grant and Transfer of Use Rights in Urban Land
(1990) (7) paved the way for the commodification of urban
land. The Constitution was changed in 2004, and the Prop-
erty Law (2007) provided equal protection for public and
private property for the first time since 1949. (8)
Urban land, one of the most important state-owned assets,
became leaseable and transferable in the late 1980s through
the mechanism of the land use rights (LUR) system. (9) The
LUR system – in emulation of “legacy” leasehold in Hong
Kong — was first developed to attract foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in order to fund the construction of Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen. (10) The lease
and transfer of LURs have given rise to the emergence of an
urban property market, which is regarded as one of the most
important indications of a revival of private property in
China. 
In parallel with changes to the urban land system, the urban
housing sector has also involved transformations: when the
PRC was established in 1949, private ownership was not
abolished immediately; in the cities, people owned their
houses. The 1954 Constitution acknowledged the status of
private ownership. However, after the “socialist transforma-
tion” (shehuizhuyi gaizao) in 1956, the housing market was
gradually abolished. (11) In the 1980s there was a massive
construction of public housing, and the dominant form was
public rental. (12) The housing was built on allocated state-
owned land, and work units (danwei) or urban Real Estate
Administration Bureaux represented the de facto “public”
owners. In the late 1980s, based on the LUR system, urban
households in China were given the opportunity to purchase
their flats/houses for the first time. (13) In March 1998, Pre-
mier Zhu Rongji introduced a package of reforms that in-
cluded terminating housing provision and allocation by work
units. (14) The subsequent direction of housing reform has
been to let individuals purchase houses, and the private
housing market has since flourished. From 2000, housing
began to be commodified (shangpin hua) in China. (15) As
Huang Youqin points out, a class of homeowners began to
emerge. (16) Yet urban residents’ land use rights are vulnera-
ble property rights. (17)
P roperty-holding  and the com plexity  of urb an gov ernance
The lease of state-owned land has been legalised since the
promulgation of the 1986 Land Administration Law
(LAL). In April 1988 the Constitution was also amended
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5. See Donald C. Clarke, “Legislating for a Market Economy in China,” The China Quarterly,
no. 191, 2007, pp. 567-585.
6. See Article 10 of the Constitution (1988). But this Article does not specify the mecha-
nism for land use rights transfer. 
7. Chengzhen guoyou tudi shiyongquan churang he zhuanrang zanxing tiaoli, enacted by
the State Council, in force in May 1990. 
8. The Property Law (wuquanfa), Article 4. 
9. The duration of an LUR varies from 40 to 70 years, depending on the types of land use, for ex-
ample, 40 years for commercial purpose, 50 years for industrial purpose, and 70 years for res-
idential purpose. In order to acquire LURs, property developers have to develop good relation-
ships with local governments, and so more rent-seeking opportunities have been generated.
10. Leasing the land in return for cash was the solution to the funding shortage in constructing
Shenzhen, but leasing publicly-owned land to “capitalists” was regarded as a betrayal of
socialist principles. In order to justify the LUR system, cadres and policy makers found a
quotation in Lenin’s The State and Revolution in which Lenin cited Engels’ The Housing
Question (1872): “The ‘working people’ remain the collective owners of the houses, facto-
ries and instruments of labour, and will hardly permit their use, at least during a transitional
period, by individuals or associations without compensation for the cost. In the same way,
the abolition of property in land is not the abolition of ground rent but its transfer, if in a mod-
ified form, to society.” See V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the
State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, Moscow, Progress Publishers,
1949[1917]), p. 57. It is said that at that time every cadre in Shenzhen could recite this quo-
tation. On this see e.g., Wu Xiaobo, Jidang sanshinian: Zhongguo qiye 1978-2008 (Chinese
Business 1978-2008, Vol.1), Beijing, Zhongxin chubanshe, 2008, pp. 52-53.
11. In the late 1980s, state policies permitted the original owners and their heirs to claim partial
property rights over houses that were once managed by the state, but even today there is not
a good mechanism for the original owners and their heirs to claim complete property rights.
12. See Youqin Huang, “The Road to Homeownership: A Longitudinal Analysis of Tenure
Transition in Urban China (1949-1994),” International Journal of Urban and Regional Re-
search, Vol. 28, no. 4, 2004, p. 778. 
13. At that time, there was a need to stimulate the economy, and the real estate market has
served as such an engine since then. 
14. During the course of the housing reform until 1998, a new kind of housing (the so-called
“reform housing,” fanggaifang) emerged. Public housing had been sold, mostly to sitting
tenants, that is, employees of work units, at discounted prices. Because this housing was
built on allocated state-owned land, and LUR transfer fees were not paid, buyers just
“owned” the houses themselves. When resale becomes necessary, the work unit had the
right of first refusal, and the owner must hand back to the land management bureaux a
proportion of the profits made as LUR transfer fees. On this see Ya Ping Wang, “Urban
Housing Reform and Finance in China: A Case Study of Beijing,” Urban Affairs Review, Vol.
36, no. 5, 2001, p. 625. According to the new housing policies introduced in 1998, em-
ployees should go to the real estate market to purchase their housing; work units should
not be involved directly in housing construction and provision, but could provide housing
subsidies for their employees. This new policy was in response to the Asian financial cri-
sis, and the government strategy at that time was to expand internal consumption. On
Zhu Rongji’s reform package see e.g., David Zweig, “China’s Stalled ‘Fifth Wave’: Zhu
Rongji’s Reform Package of 1998-2000,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, no. 2, 2001, pp. 231-247. 
15. On housing commodification see e.g., Min Zhou and John R. Logan, “Market Transition and
the Commodification of Housing in Urban China,” in John R. Logan (ed.) The New Chinese
City: Globalization and Market Reform, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 137-152.
16. See Youqin Huang, “The Road to Homeownership,” art. cit., p.774. 
17. Although urban land has been commodified, it is far from being privatised. LURs are vul-
nerable to compulsory reclamation by the state, and ordinary owners do not have secu-
rity for their properties. House demolition (chai qian) in urban China has generated pub-
lic riots in recent years. House demolition is, in practice, at the discretion of local gov-
ernments, and people usually get compensation below the market price.
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to provide that “the right of land use can be transferred in
accordance with the law” (Clause 4 of Article 10). (18) Taken
together, allocations (huabo) and grants (churang) constitute
the primary market for LURs. In May 1990, LURs were
separated from ownership and became transferable (e.g., by
sale or rental) in the market by tender (zhaobiao), auction
(paimai), or negotiation (xieshang). The transfer of LURs
created a secondary property market. However, in reality,
sale by negotiation without a transparent procedure is the
most popular way of transferring LURs in the secondary
property market. (19)
The complexity of the primary property market is due largely
to the complexity of governance, for example, conflicts be-
tween the central government in Beijing and local govern-
ments in the provinces and below. (20) Although the revised
1998 LAL was designed to centralise power in the State
Council to enable better management of land, “real” power
is dispersed between different levels of government and mo-
bilised in the dynamics of their interactions. (21) For example,
at the national level, the Ministry of Construction and the
Ministry of Land and Resources (22) under the State Council
may coordinate with each other in regulating the property
market. (23) At provincial and local levels, however, real estate
and land management departments are directly responsible
to provincial or local governments. (24) The central Ministries
do not have direct control over these local departments, but
only provide working guidance. 
One of the most important reasons for conflicts between
central and local governments is competition for financial re-
sources. A tax sharing system (fenshuizhi) was adopted in
1994 as an attempt to enhance central government revenues
and increase the transparency of tax revenues (at least to
Beijing). As a result, central government grants to cities for
urban infrastructure have been significantly reduced, so that
local governments now need more financial resources to ad-
minister the cities and finance urban construction. As a re-
sult, they are reluctant to share land revenues with the cen-
tral government. (25)
Land has become an important source of revenue and the
main vehicle for local governments to compete and bargain
with the central government. (26) A variety of revenues can be
extracted from land, (27) which, under the current system,
local governments do not have to share with Beijing. (28) In
addition, income from selling LURs is the major source of
off-balance sheet/self-raised revenue (zichou zijin) for local
governments. 
The emergence of the black market is the result of this dual-
track land allocation system, and the growing price gap of
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18. LURs are assigned in two ways: allocation and grants. Allocation refers to the transfer
of LURs to state owned or non-profit users without either time limits or LUR transfer fees
(tudi shiyongquan churangjin); grant refers to the transfer of LURs to commercial users
for a fixed period in return for LUR transfer fees. See Samuel P. S. Ho and George C. S.
Lin, “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices,” The
China Quarterly, no. 175, 2003, pp. 687-688. 
19. See e.g., Chengri Ding and Gerrit Knaap, “Urban Land Policy Reform in China’s Transi-
tional Economy,” in Chengri Ding and Yan Song (eds.), Emerging land and housing mar-
kets in China, Cambridge, Mass, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2005, p. 22; Ling-Hin
Li, Urban Land Reform in China, London, Macmillan, 1999, p. 26.  
20. The central government has some mechanisms to control local governments. For exam-
ple, the central government regularly rotates the officials between provinces; the Party
secretaries of Beijing and Shanghai have traditionally been members of the Politburo;
before working in the provinces, many officials have worked extensively in central min-
istries. See generally Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Po-
litical Economy of Central Local Relations During the Reform Era, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1996. Provincial officials’ career achievements are assessed by statis-
tics; as a result, “statistics make officials, and officials make statistics” (shuzi chuguan
guanchu shuzi). There are central-local conflicts within provinces as well. 
21. For example, Article 6 of the Real Estate Law defines the functions and powers of government
departments at various levels. See Ling-Hin Li, Urban Land Reform in China, op. cit., p. 32. 
22. Now five new “super ministries” have been established, including the conversion of the
Ministry of Construction into the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction. See
“China to set up five new ‘super ministries,’” at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2008npc/ 2008-03/11/ content_
6526802.htm, accessed on 11 March 2008.
23. For example, they made regulations to cool down the property market, and to warn of
the risk of purchasing “minor property rights apartments.” There are also functional
overlaps and conflicts between these ministries. 
24. See Ling-Hin Li, Urban Land Reform in China, op. cit., p. 32.  
25. See Qingshu Xie, A. R. Chanbari Parsa, and Barry Redding, “The Emergence of the Urban
Land Market in China: Evolution, Structure, Constraints and Perspectives,” Urban Stud-
ies, Vol. 39, no. 8, 2002, p. 1392. 
26. See You-tien Hsing, “Land and Territorial Politics in Urban China,” The China Quarterly,
no. 187, 2006, p. 576. 
27. For example, tax. Land-use taxation developed in parallel with the LUR system. How-
ever, as value-added tax is one of the shared taxes between the central and local gov-
ernments (central government: 75%; local governments: 25%), in order to collect more
tax revenue, local officials have a range of implements in the name of modernisation,
for example, seizure of farmland and extension of infrastructure in urban expansion,
which led to the property market boom. See Richard Walker and Daniel Buck, “The Chi-
nese Road: Cities in the Transition to Capitalism,” New Left Review, no. 46, 2007, p. 63. 
28. This is because of the existence of “extra-budgetary” revenues (yusuanwai zijin) such
as local taxes and land transfer fees. See e.g., Ho and Lin, “Emerging Land Markets in
Rural and Urban China,” art. cit.; You-tien Hsing, “Brokering power and property in
China’s townships,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 19, no.1, 2006, p. 108. 
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
A Uygur man carries his belongings as he moves to the
new apartments in the suburbs of Hami city. 
© AFP
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LURs between primary and secondary property markets
means that local governments can acquire LURs at a low
price and sell them to property developers at a high price.
As analysed above, when the LUR system was introduced,
it was hoped that the value of land would be reflected prop-
erly in the market. However, a high proportion of land allo-
cation is still carried out on an administrative basis, (29)and
only a small portion of land is leased by the state to the users
through paid transfer of use rights. (30) This means that local
governments can monopolise the supply of LURs. (31) The
1998 LAL attempted to remove authority to approve land
requisitions from local governments below the provincial
level. However, local governments often exceed their author-
ity to approve land use. (32) Numerous public and private bro-
kers with links to state agencies that have the power to allo-
cate and manage land have arisen to pursue rents generated
from the gap that exists between the primary and secondary
property markets. 
The black market is also manifested in the role of rapidly ex-
panding “private” property developers. (33) It is becoming in-
creasingly common for party/governmental officials to set up
private businesses by various informal means. (34) Commodi-
fication of the public housing provision system has been one
of the most important aspects of economic reform. But is it
the same as privatisation? The liberal assumption of the dis-
tinction between public and private cannot easily be trans-
posed to the Chinese context. The public and the private are
intertwined, given the complexity of governance in China.
Land-related corruption or rent-seeking is usually associated
with land approval and bidding processes. (35) The party-state
defines, regulates, and directly participates in the market. (36)“ M inor  p ro pe r ty right s”  a p ar tm e nts— a de fac to re a le st ate  ma r ke t  and a  gr as s-ro otsi nit i at iv e
Dual land ownership (37)and the dual land allocation system
explain the high price of real estate in urban China. While
the price in the urban property market keeps soaring, (38)
“minor property rights” apartments are emerging in rural
areas. This kind of apartment is built on rural residential
plots (zhaiji di). The buyers of these properties cannot ob-
tain property right certificates (chanquan zheng), because
the premises are built on collectively owned land that is re-
served for residential use by farmers, and cannot be com-
modified in the real estate market according to the Land Ad-
ministration Law (2004) and the Property Law (2007). Yet
the market for “minor property rights” apartments flourishes,
because prices are low compared with those in the urban
property market.
The legality of “minor property rights” apartments has been
subject to investigation and has even been declared illegal.
For example, in the 17th National Land Day campaign, (39)
jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Land and Resources
and the Beijing municipal government, one of the issues that
seized people’s attention was concern about “minor property
rights” apartments. The Ministry of Construction warned
purchasers of the risks involved in buying these apartments.
By contrast, township governments clearly acquiesced in the
development of “minor property rights” apartments, (40)
which is another illustration of the complex relationship be-
tween the central and local governments. On 11 December
2007, the State Council declared that “city and township
residents should not purchase ‘minor property rights’ apart-
ments in the rural area.” (41) Minor property rights apartments
29N o  2 0 0 8 / 4
29. For example, Huabo tudi shiyongquan zanxing tiaoli (Provisional Regulations on Admin-
istratively-Allocated Land Use Rights) (1992), enacted by the State Land Administration
Bureau on 24 February 1992; in effect on 24 February 1992. 
30. See Anthony Gar-on Yeh, “The Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China,” in Chen-
gri Ding and Yan Song (eds.), Emerging land and housing markets in China, op. cit., p. 40.
31. See Anthony Gar On Yeh, “Dual Land Market and Internal Spatial Structure of Chinese
Cities,” in Laurence J. C. Mar and Fulong Wu (eds.), Restructuring the Chinese City:
Changing Society, Economy and Space, New York, NY, Routledge, 2005, p. 60.  
32. See Xie, Parsa, and Redding, “The Emergence of the Urban Land Market in China,” art.
cit., p. 1392.  
33. There are three kinds of property developers in today’s China: state enterprises, private
companies, and foreign companies (there have been more restrictions on foreign prop-
erty developing companies since 2006). See Walker and Buck, “The Chinese Road,” art.
cit., p. 48.   
34. See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang, In Search of Civil Society: Market Re-
form and Social Changes in Contemporary China, New York, Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 199. 
35. See e.g., Ho and Lin, “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China,” art. cit.;
Walker and Buck, “The Chinese Road,” art. cit..  
36. Paid transfer of LURs has become the basis for partnership between the government
and the private sector in China. See e.g., Shenjing He and Fulong Wu, “Property-Led Re-
development in Post Reform China: A Case Study of Xintiandi Redevelopment Project in
Shanghai,” Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 27, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-23; On “a government for
capital,” see Walker and Buck, “The Chinese Road,” art. cit., p. 61. 
37. That is, urban land is owned by the state, while rural land is owned by collectives. 
38. It should be pointed out that bubbles in the property market have now emerged, as seen
in the recent plummeting house prices in Shenzhen in 2008. 
39. The 17th National Land Day was on 25 June 2007. 
40. Township governments do not have the authority to grant land use rights, therefore they
cannot profit from collecting LUR transfer fees. Township governments could gain more
profit from making use of grey areas such as “minor property rights apartments,” and
competing for more income from land with the superior governments. On the role of
township governments, see e.g., You-tien Hsing, “Broking Power and Property in China’s
Townships,” art. cit., pp. 103-124. 
41. See Wu Jiandong, “Xiaochanquan fang bude mai bu yiweizhe bujiejue wenti” (A ban on “minor
property rights” apartments does not mean that the problem will not be resolved), Nanfang
Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 20 December 2007. In http://bj.house.sina.com.cn/dcpl/2007-
12-20/1417230527.html (last visited 16 October 2008).
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in some areas were demolished by force. (42) However, these
counter-measures have not made “minor property rights”
apartments disappear. So what will be the fate of “minor
property rights” apartments? This question will be further
discussed in Section VI. 
“Minor property rights” apartments have existed “under-
ground” for more than 10 years. The central government has
issued various regulations concerning them, which suggest
some uncertainty about how best to deal with them. (43)
Chapter 13 of the property law deals with the LURs of rural
residential plots, but it is unclear about their transfer. There-
fore, the transfer and sale of rural residential plots and the
sale and transfer of LURs for construction purposes by farm-
ers (if not reclaimed by the state first) are still banned. De-
spite this uncertainty, various kinds of experiments have
been conducted by localities. In 1992, a farmland sharehold-
ing system (tudi gufen zhi) was tested in Nanhai, a county-
level city in Guangdong Province. Land use rights of individ-
ual farmers were collectivised by “natural” villages and then
by the administrative village to which these villages be-
longed. The value of farmland was appraised and divided
into shares. A shareholding cooperative was thus formed.
The farmland was rented by the cooperative for industrial
purposes. Farmers could enjoy the profits of industrialisation
according to the shares they had. In this case, the purpose
of use of agricultural land had been changed through the cir-
culation of land use rights. This system was called the Nan-
hai model (nanhai moshi). In 1995, Suzhou in Jiangsu
Province was the first to approve the transfer of LURs for
construction purposes. Similar experiments were subse-
quently conducted at Huzhou in Zhejiang Province in 1997,
and at Wuhu in Anhui Province in 2000. (44) The practice in
Guangdong is notable. In 2005, the Guangdong provincial
government announced the promulgation of a law entitled
“Guangdong Regulations for the Transfer of Land Use
Rights of Collectively Owned Land for Construction Pur-
poses.” This was the first time in China that LURs for con-
struction purposes were legalised via provincial-level legisla-
tion. It was also a sign of the marketisation of LURs of rural
collective construction land. In 2007, Guangdong introduced
further reforms permitting rural residential plots to be trans-
ferred in the market. (45)
Further local reforms on the rural LURs focus on allowing
farmers to contribute rural land contractual management
rights as shares to enterprises or joint ventures. The Land
Contracting Law and the LAL conflict on this point. (46)
Despite these contradictory laws and regulations, on 1 July
2007, Chongqing allowed farmers to contribute LURs to
joint enterprises or joint ventures as shares, provided that
the purpose of use of arable land is not changed. Shang-
hai’s reform is even more extensive: on 2 July 2007, the
Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Administration Bu-
reau allowed farmers to use and rent their residential plots
to run village inns, or so-called “family farms,” which ex-
ceeds the limits within which the use purpose of arable
land cannot be changed and paves the way for farmers to
participate in urbanisation and industrialisation directly. (47)
Yet these reforms are clearly against Articles 60 and 63 of
the LAL. Gre y ar ea s:  Bl urr ing  le gal  a ndadm ini str at iv e bo undar ie s  inmo der n Chi na
Thirty years after the re-admission of private property into
the Chinese lexicon in the name of economic reform and
opening-up, (48) real estate has become a far from obscure
object of desire in China. Chinese dream of owning their
homes and invest most of their savings in this project. (49) But
to what extent do people own their flats or houses? What
does ownership mean? And why is ownership important?
Is it important because it is closely linked to status, privi-
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42. See Ding Rui, “Guotu bu: yanzhong weigui de xiaochanquan fang jiangbei chaichu” (The
Ministry of Land Resources: “Minor property rights” apartments that contravene the reg-
ulations will be demolished), in Beijing Shangbao (Beijing Business Today), 13 Decem-
ber 2007. In http://news.hexun.com/2007-12-13/102266679.html (last visited 20 Octo-
ber 2008). 
43. In terms of the central government’s policy, in 2004, the State Council published “On
deepening the reform and tightening the land administration” (2004, No. 28), which
stressed that LURs of collectively owned land could be transferred according to law;
however, it did not go beyond the limits provided by the LAL and the Guarantee Law
(danbao fa). The newly published property law is still within the framework of the LAL.
See Article 153 of Property law; Article 62 of the LAL. 
44. See Chen Xu, “ Xiaochanquanfang shi gaige chiyi bujue de chengben” (Minor property
rights apartments are the cost of the hesitation of reforms), Oriental Morning Post, 10
July 2007. 
45. See Tan Jialong, “Guangdong nirang nongcun zhaijidi shangshi liuzhuan” (Guangdong
plans to permit rural residential plots to be transferred in the market), Xinhua wang (Xin-
hua Net), 26 June 2007, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/5912261.html (last
visited 4 September 2008).
46. Article 42 of the Land Contracting Law allows farmers to contribute rural land contrac-
tual management rights as shares; according to Article 60 of the LAL, farmers cannot
contribute LURs to joint enterprises or joint ventures as investments, or assign LURs to
township enterprises without approval from the government at or above county levels. 
47. See “Shanghai: Nongmin zhaijidi ke ban ‘nongjiale’” (Shanghai: Rural residential plots
could run “family farms”), Xin nongcun shangbao (New Countryside Commerce), in
http://xncsb.mofcom.gov.cn/listx.asp?id=112335 (last visited 3 October 2008). 
48. That is, economic growth and attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
49. More Chinese households put their money in assets such as stocks and the real estate
market; see e.g., Olivia Chung, “Chinese Favor Bourses, Bullion over Banks,” Asia Times
(online), 25 October 2007. Because of the uneven development of the stock market, in-
vesting in the real estate market has become the first choice. 
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lege, or wealth? Who has the power to define ownership?
And how do they draw the boundaries between the public
and the private? 
Law can provide some of the answers to these questions. Yet
many uncertainties over property law itself remain — for ex-
ample, whether ownership should be formulated as an eco-
nomic institution (jingji zhidu) or a social institution (shehui
zhidu). 
Furthermore, ownership defined in law and ownership as
understood and practised in society often diverge, and
property lawmaking often lags behind social change. (50)
Rather than using a much broader concept of property
rights (caichan quan), wuquan is defined in the 2007
Property Law, and it only refers to property rights over tan-
gible things. (51) Specifically speaking, wuquan means the
exclusive rights that directly control specific things.
Wuquan includes ownership (suoyou quan), usufructuary
(yongyi wuquan), and security rights (danbao wuquan). (52)
Usufruct is the legal right to possess, use, and benefit from
property that belongs to another person. In terms of
usufruct, the decentralised interests pertaining to land are
mainly categorised as “land use rights” (tudi shiyong quan)
of state-owned land (mostly urban land), (53) “contractual
management rights” (chengbao jingyingquan) of collec-
tively owned rural land, (54) as well as other rural land use
rights including those of residential plots and those for con-
struction purposes. Although state ownership of urban land
may be straightforward in the law, whether the central gov-
ernment or local governments can represent the state as the
owner is debatable. Moreover, collective ownership of
rural land is fragile, and various kinds of land use rights are
also ambiguous. 
There exist variations, tensions, and intricacies in terms of
different forms of de facto ownership in practice. Meanwhile
the boundaries between public property and private property
are blurred, and property rights are fragmented. For exam-
ple, state-owned assets have been transferred to those who
hold political power; local governments have de facto control
over both collectively-owned rural land and urban land;
home buyers have ownership over buildings or parts of build-
ings but not over the land on which their flats and houses are
built. The post-1978 process of property lawmaking is a
move to “propertise” the fragmented rights that emerged in
the process of economic reform; however, there are still
residual categories that are difficult to define or “legalise” in
a systematic way. (55)
State ownership was based on the Soviet version of state
ownership — the factory model. (56) But this did not overcome
the scarcity of resources; centrally-planned allocation was in-
efficient, and was gradually converted into allocation of re-
sources through the market. However, in the meantime, pol-
icy makers had to make sure that state-owned enterprises
were able to acquire resources and did not lose the compe-
tition with private enterprises; a dual-track price system thus
emerged in 1985. The state retained control of the prices of
goods distributed through administrative channels in accor-
dance with the plan, while the market would decide the
prices of goods produced outside the plan. (57) The distinction
between “inside the system” (tizhinei) and “outside the sys-
tem” (tizhiwai) emerged, although it is hard to give a spe-
cific definition of this distinction. “Inside the system” could
mean inside the plan or having easy access to resources.
Those with the political influence to gain access to goods
(people inside the system) bought goods at low state-set
prices that could vary across and within provinces and sold
those goods at higher prices, and thus made enormous prof-
its. Resources are transferred from insiders to outsiders by
insider privileges. Great profits can be made. This phenom-
enon is termed guandao. 
Economic reform has seen the selective re-admission of pri-
vate property into the socio-economic framework. For exam-
ple, the 1982 Constitution recognised the “individual econ-
omy” of urban and rural working people (geti jingji) (58) as a
“complement” (buchong) to the socialist public economy
(Article 11). The 1988 amendment allowed the private
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50. It should be remembered that China may not be so different from some western soci-
eties like the UK or the USA in this respect. The “sub-prime” crisis is a reminder of the
nature and underpinnings of home ownership in the West.
51. An important aspect of the English approach of thinking about property is the distinction
between rights to land and rights to other things, or between real and personal property
(including tangibles and intangibles). See W. T. Murphy, Simon Roberts, and Tatiana
Flessas, Understanding Property Law 4ed. London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, p. 56. Chi-
nese property law makes a distinction between immoveable (bu dongchan) and move-
able property (dongchan). See Article 2 of the Property Law (2007). But intangibles, like
debts, patents, copyright, and trademarks, are not subject to Chinese property law, nor
are shares in a limited company.
52. The Property Law (2007), Article 2. 
53. The Constitution Article 10, (1982, amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004).
54. The General Principles of the Civil Law (GPCL) (1986), Article 80. 
55. For example, “minor property rights” apartments built on collectively-owned rural land. 
56. That is, socialisation of the organisation of the activity or process and the non-separa-
tion of home and work embedded in the total institution cradle-to-grave theory of the
danwei. For the model, see especially V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution: The Marxist
Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, op.cit.. 
57. On the dual-track price system, see Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima, and Dwight H.
Perkins, Under New Ownership: Privatizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises, Washing-
ton, World Bank, 2006, p. 61; Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking,
Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2003. 
58. That is, economic activities by self-employed individual entrepreneurs with fewer than
eight employers.
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economy (siying jingji) to exist and develop within the lim-
its prescribed by law (Article 11). The 1985-1989 stage also
saw the rise of privately run and “red hat” enterprises
(hongmaozi qiye), (59) which were established under the la-
bels of SOEs or collective enterprises to disguise their pri-
vate nature. After the “southern tour” of Deng Xiaoping in
1992, private enterprises flourished nationwide, including
taking off the hats of many “red-hat enterprises.” (60) Since
the corporatisation programme (i.e., the modern enterprise
system initiated in 1994), the focus of SOE reform has
shifted from delegation of decision-making authority to cor-
porate governance and ownership. The 15th National Con-
gress of the CCP in 1997 declared further reform of own-
ership. In his report to that Congress, Jiang Zemin eulo-
gised “grasping the large and freeing the small” (zhuada
fangxiao), and this was endorsed as the central economic
reform strategy. Small and medium-sized enterprises were
to be sold to private owners. 
Yet as more and more “rents” have been “privatised,” the
control of public assets has been gradually transferred to the
persons or privileged groups who hold political power. In the
era of fiscal and political decentralisation (from 1994 on-
wards in particular), the quasi-federal character of local gov-
ernments gives them more power to control and allocate re-
sources, and the identity of the owner(s) of public assets has
become even more ambiguous. In terms of collective owner-
ship over rural land, local governments and rent-seeking local
officials operate as de facto owners, and farmers are ex-
cluded. 
The result is that today there is often a gap between own-
ership defined in the law and ownership as understood
and practised in society. Political elites define the concep-
tion of ownership and the distinction between public prop-
erty and private property in law. These conceptions and
distinctions were and are manifested in Mao’s revolution-
ary rhetoric, as well as in Deng’s reform rhetoric. They
served and still serve for the purposes of rulership and
governance. The elites shift, the need for governance
shifts, and the conception of ownership and the distinction
between the public and the private change with these
shifts. In contemporary China, there is a clear distinction
between public property and private property in law, but
the boundaries between the public and the private in real-
ity are blurred. What is specific here (although not unique
to China) is the potential for a large “gap” to emerge be-
tween legal stipulations and socio-economic practices, a
gap that is quickly being filled by market-watchers or “en-
trepreneurs.” 
New  change s  to  the  r ura l  la ndsys tem  and the  r ura l-ur ba n div ide  
As we were completing this paper, the third Plenum of the
17th CCP Central Committee (hereinafter the Plenum) was
held between 9 and 12 October 2008. The Plenum has set
a new round of rural reforms in motion, and has brought new
changes to rural land use rights and the rural-urban divide.
Here, it is necessary to analyse these new changes and their
implications. 
There are several important aims in the decision (jueding) (61)
of the Plenum published on 19 October 2008 (hereinafter
the decision). First, it confirms that contractual management
rights of rural land will remain unchanged and stable for a
long period (baochi wending bing changjiu bubian). The de-
cision also permits various means of contractual management
rights circulation (tudi chengbao jingyingquan liuzhuan), in-
cluding subcontracting (zhuangbao), leasing (chuzu), ex-
changing (huhuan), transferring (zhuanrang), and sharehold-
ing cooperatives (gufen hezuo). (62) This decision emphasises
that circulation of contractual management rights should not
change the nature of rural land ownership and the agricultural
purpose of land use. The decision retains the provisions as set
in the Land Contracting Law (2002) and the Land Admin-
istration Law (2004). (63)
Secondly, the decision aims to improve the system of rural
residential plots, tighten the management of residential plots,
and protect farmers’ usufructuary rights. Although some peo-
ple claim that the decision has important implications for the
possibility of legalising “minor property rights” apart-
ments, (64) the stress on farmers’ usufructuary rights in this de-
cision is ambiguous. Usufruct is a lesser property right than
ownership, and it does not include the right to dispose of the
property. Thus, the decision has not granted farmers the
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59. See Clarke, “Legislating for a Market Economy in China,” art. cit., p. 569. 
60. See e.g., Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Chinese Communist Party, Pri-
vate Entrepreneurs, and Political Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
61. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tuijin nongcun gaige fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding” (The decision of the CCP Central Committee on several crucial issues regard-
ing rural reform and development), available in http://politics.people.com.cn/
GB/1026/8194064.html (last visited 19 October 2008). 
62. Article 32 of Land Contracting Law (2002) already provides that “contractual manage-
ment rights obtained through household contract may, according to law, be circulated
by subcontracting, leasing, exchanging and transferring or other means.” 
63. See this prohibition of changing agricultural purposes in contractual management rights
circulation in Clause 2 of Article 33 in the Land Contracting Law (2002). 
64. Jia Huajie, “Xiao chanquan fang dengdai diebian” (“Minor property rights” apartments
are waiting for approval), in <http://news.sohu.com/20081010/n259947051.shtml>
(last visited 19 October 2008). 
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right to dispose of their residential plots freely such as by
selling them as “minor property rights” apartments. From
this perspective, the decision still limits the circulation of res-
idential plots. (65)
The third aim is to reform the system of land acquisition and
land use rights requisition. The decision emphasises that
using rural land for construction purposes should clearly de-
fine whether it is for the “public interest” or profit-seeking.
The decision also calls for reducing the scope of land acqui-
sition and improving the system of compensation. 
Lastly, the decision treats rural and urban land use rights for
construction purposes (jianshe yongdi shiyongquan) equally,
and aims to gradually set up a unified market for circulation
of such land use rights. Apart from rural land use rights for
construction purposes, the decision also approves the use of
collectively owned rural land in for-profit projects. 
The reform is designed to boost rural income and rural pro-
ductivity, stimulate rural consumption, and diminish the
rural-urban divide by gradually abandoning the household
registration system. This reform is also regarded as a prelude
to the reform of the rural financial system, by, for example,
providing loans for farmers. The reform will also bring
changes to the relation between the state and farmers, as
well as adjustment of interests gained by different groups
throughout the economic reform commenced in 1978. How-
ever, the effect of the new measures regarding the circula-
tion of contractual management rights is debatable. Some
worry that, without a functioning social security system, loos-
ening the control over the circulation of rural land use rights
may make farmers transfer contractual management rights
cheaply to big agricultural conglomerates. The number of
landless farmers could increase, and a new form of inequal-
ity could thus emerge. 
Clarifying the land rights of farmers is the focus of the new
rural reform. However, contractual management rights circu-
lation does not equal privatisation, since collective ownership
of rural land is maintained. Moreover, circulation of land use
rights has been confined to contractual management rights,
and circulation of residential plots and rural land for con-
struction purposes has not yet been clarified. Nor does the
new development of the circulation of contractual manage-
ment rights amount to recognition of a permanent tenancy in
which the state nationalises rural land and then grants farm-
ers permanent land use rights. In the decision, contractual
management rights will remain unchanged and stable for a
long period rather than permanently. The word long (chang)
has been used rather than “permanent” (yong). Thus, it is
too early to say that the long-term trend of the rural land sys-
tem will follow the model of (urban) leasehold as practised
in the UK. 
The confirmation of the long period of contractual manage-
ment rights and the encouragement of various experiments
with land use rights circulation could be seen as further steps
towards the revival of private property in China, as well as
the endeavours of the state to fill the gap between law and
social practice. However, the extent and effect of such a re-
vival is a complex issue if we consider several questions. 
One of the most important questions is how the existing
legal system will respond to the new policy, and how the
amendments to these laws can be made coherent. The
changes to the rural land system again demonstrate that legal
reform in China still relies on Party policy, and legal reform
usually lags behind policy change. Laws pertaining to prop-
erty need to conform to Party policy. Such laws involve the
Constitution (2004), the Property Law (2007), the Land
Administration Law (2004), and so on. Moreover, there are
already different experiments with the circulation of land use
rights in different localities (see Section IV), and the ques-
tion is how to deal with these local experiments that contra-
vene the existing legal system. It is especially debatable
whether the circulation of rural residential plots such as sell-
ing and purchasing “minor property rights” apartments is
constitutional. Article 10 of the Constitution (2004) is am-
biguous regarding this issue. Although it provides that “land
use rights could be transferred,” the Constitution does not
specify the mechanisms for such transfers. Co nclus ion
This paper has analysed the property market in urban China
against the background of broader legal and political transfor-
mations, and has reflected upon the meaning of private prop-
erty and the nature of markets in China. Although the LUR
system represents a comprehensive change in the state-owned
urban land system, LURs are still allocated administratively
to both primary and secondary land use markets. State agen-
cies get LURs free or at low prices and without time limits,
but “new economic players” need to bid or negotiate for
urban LURs for a fixed period, (66) and they have to cultivate
good relationships with agencies such as local governments.
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65. On 22 October 2008, the CCP Central Committee declared that “minor property rights”
apartments contravened the law, and construction of new apartments should not con-
tinue. Although the interests of current purchasers should be protected, the legalisation
of the existing apartments is still under review. On this see http://sc.people.com.cn/
news/HTML/2008/10/24/20081024084319.htm (last visited 24 October 2008). 
66. See Ho and Lin, “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China,” art. cit., p. 705. 
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Far from being a free market, the property market in China
has been largely politicised, and the ambiguous and complex
relationships between the central government, local govern-
ments as entrepreneurs, and non-governmental market players
has blurred the boundaries between the public and private
sectors as well as the division between the urban and the
rural. To characterise the reforms in the area of property law
and urban developments as a process of privatisation along
the lines of neo-liberal theories would be misleading. 
Economic reform from 1978 onwards involved “groping for
stones to cross the river,” (67) as Deng Xiaoping put it, mean-
ing that it was pragmatic and directed by the “facts” as they
seemed at the time without clear guidelines or legal rules,
which, usually, lagged behind the pace of economic reform.
Pragmatism could and can thus drift into opportunism. This
attitude towards reform has shielded it from ideological de-
bates over socialism versus capitalism and has opened up
much space for the growth of the private sector. China has
become a laboratory in which people (and governments) can
experiment. In this sense China has joined the modern
world. Everything in society can be commodified and mate-
rialised, but only in China’s own terms. 
The cities have become laboratories for governmental “ex-
periments.” Some grassroots initiatives, though, do emerge
from the under-defined legal and governmental boundaries.
“Minor property rights” apartments flag the complexity and
ambiguity that result when time-warped and rigidified
urban/rural legal and governmental distinctions become dis-
solved through the expansion of urban centres into their (ju-
ridically rural) peripheries.•
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67. Mozhe shitou guohe.
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Glossary
gong 公 
si 私 
huji zhidu 戶籍制度 
xiaochanquan 小產權 
xiangchanquan 鄉產權 
wuquanfa 物權法 
shehuizhuyi gaizao 社會主義改造 
danwei 單位 
shangpin hua 商品化 
huabo 劃撥 
